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ABSTRACT
The Framers of the United States Constitution created three distinct
bodies of government. The Legislature makes laws, the Executive en-
forces laws, and the Judiciary interprets the laws. The Framers designed
this three-part government to ensure no one branch became too powerful.
Accordingly, when Congress enacts legislation that tells courts how to
decide a pending lawsuit, it threatens the doctrine of separation of pow-
ers that defines the American government.
In Bank Markazi v. Peterson, the Supreme Court upheld federal leg-
islation that swept away the foreign sovereignty of Iran's central bank for
the Bank Markazi plaintiffs only. Previous Supreme Court precedent
allowed Congress to enact laws that identified cases by name or docket
number but only if the new law amended or repealed the underlying law
at issue in the case. The underlying statute at issue in Bank Markazi was
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). Despite the FSIA's "ter-
rorism exception," which allows Americans to file suit against state
sponsors of terrorism in the courts of the United States, the FSIA still
shields from execution a foreign central bank. Instead of amending the
relevant portion of the FSIA that protects foreign central banks, Congress
drafted 22 U.S.C. § 8772, which removed the central bank barrier for the
Bank Markazi plaintiffs only.
This Case Comment argues that in enacting § 8772, Congress im-
permissibly commandeered the Judiciary's authority by picking the win-
ner of a pending lawsuit. In allowing Congress to do so, the Court greatly
expanded the power of Congress at the Judiciary's expense. Now Con-
gress can pick the winners and losers in pending litigation without
amending the underlying law. This Comment also argues that Congress
cannot single out specific parties when enacting legislation, even if the
new law amends or repeals the underlying statute. Finally, this Comment
proposes a three-factor test for courts to analyze separation of powers
issues when Congress passes a law that affects pending litigation.
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INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court recently ruled in Bank Markazi v. PetersonI that
a provision of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of
2012, codified as 22 U.S.C. § 8772, does not offend the separation of
2
powers doctrine. This decision is significant because it departed from a
150-year-old Civil War-era precedent that prevented Congress from
picking the winner in a pending lawsuit and, in doing so, greatly expand-
ed the powers of the Legislature at the Judiciary's expense.3 What was
once a very defined line between the Legislature and the Judiciary is now
a gray line drawn heavily in Congress's favor.
The "judicial Power of the United States" is vested in the Federal
Judiciary.4 The Supreme Court has held that this provision "safeguards
the role of the Judicial Branch in our tripartite system."5 In Pennsylvania
v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co.,6 the Court decided that so long as
Congress amends or repeals a statute underlying pending litigation, the
law is valid regardless of whether it alters the outcome of the lawsuit.7
Sixteen years later, the Court decided what is arguably the quintes-
sential separation of powers case. In United States v. Klein,8 the Court
established three core principles: (1) Congress cannot direct courts to
reach a certain outcome in specific litigation or command courts how to
resolve a particular case; (2) Congress cannot force courts to interpret
1. 136 S. Ct. 1310 (2016).
2. Id. at 1329.
3. See Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421, 431 (1855).
4. Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1330 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. III,
§ 1).
5. Id. (quoting Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 883, 850 (1986)).
6. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421 (1855).
7. Id. at 431.
8. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871).
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and apply the Constitution in a certain way; and (3) Congress cannot
enact laws that violate an individual's constitutional rights.9
Well over one hundred years after Klein, the Court faced similar is-
sues in Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Society.'0 However, the Court de-
clined to address a Klein argument but reaffirmed the Wheeling Bridge
"amend or repeal" rule, holding that the newly enacted statute "com-
pelled changes in law, not findings or results under old law."" Section
8772 implicates Wheeling Bridge, Klein, and Robertson because it di-
rects a court to resolve the case in a particular way and fails to amend or
repeal the underlying law, namely the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
of 1976 (FSIA).12
This Case Comment will argue that Bank Markazi was wrongly de-
cided. Part I of this Comment will first review the Court's history of cas-
es analyzing the separation of powers doctrine. Part II provides a brief
summary of the facts of Bank Markazi as well as the majority and dis-
senting opinions. Part III explains Congress's limits when it passes legis-
lation that directly impacts pending litigation. This Comment will then
provide a three-factor test that courts could apply to ensure Congress can
carry out its legislative duties without offending the separation of powers
doctrine.
I. BACKGROUND
Separation of powers between the three branches of government is
derived from the "tripartite structure of the Constitution."'3 The Judici-
ary's primary function is "to say what the law is."l 4 When Congress at-
tempts to commandeer the Judiciary, the Supreme Court will strike down
the legislative act as a violation of the separation of powers doctrine.'5 In
1855, Congress overturned a judicial order that declared a bridge a nui-
sance by reclassifying the bridge as a post road for the United States mail
9. See id. at 148; see also Stephen I. Vladeck, Why Klein (Still) Matters. Congressional
Deception and the War on Terrorism, 5 J.NAT'L SECURITY L. & POL'Y 251, 252 (2011); Howard M.
Wasserman, The Irrepressible Myth of Klein, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 53, 56 (2010).
10. See Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc'y (Robertson II), 503 U.S. 429, 440 (1992) (dis-
cussing how Congress's passing of a new law constitutes a modification of prior law).
11. Id. at 438, 441; see also William D. Araiza, The Trouble with Robertson: Equal Protec-
tion, the Separation of Powers, and the Line Between Statutory Amendment and Statutory Interpre-
tation, 48 CATH. U. L. REv. 1055, 1069 (1999).
12. Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1316 (2016) ("The question raised by peti-
tioner Bank Markazi: Does § 8872 violate the separation of powers by purporting to change the law
for, and directing a particular result in, a single pending case?").
13. Amy D. Ronner, Judicial Self-Demise: The Test of When Congress Impermissibly In-
trudes on Judicial Power After Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Society and the Federal Appellate
Courts' Rejection of the Separation of Powers Challenges to the New Section of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, 35 ARIZ. L. REV. 1037, 1037 (1993).
14. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
15. See Lawrence G. Sager, Klein's First Principle: A Proposed Solution, 86 GEO. L.J. 2525,
2525-26 (1998).
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service.1 6 Congress essentially amended the underlying law by legalizing
the structure.17 The Supreme Court upheld the legislation in Wheeling
Bridge because the bridge was no longer a nuisance in the eyes of the
law following the enactment of the new statute.18 Congress simply creat-
ed new legal circumstances, which the courts then applied to the ordinary
rules concerning nuisances.'9
Sixteen years later, in 1871, the Court decided its most important
separation of powers case: United States v. Klein.20 In Klein, the Court
declared a congressional statute unconstitutional because it prescribed a
"rule of decision" in a pending case.2' In the wake of the Civil War,
Congress enacted the Abandoned and Captured Property Act of 1863
(1863 Act), which granted the proceeds the government collected from
the sale of seized property to the original owners of that property provid-
ed they had not supported Confederate soldiers or the rebellion.22 Later,
President Lincoln offered full pardons to persons engaged in the rebel-
23lion if they swore an oath of allegiance to the United States. One of the
pardoned rebellion supporters was a man named Wilson, whose cotton
was seized and sold during the Civil War.24 Klein, the administrator of
Wilson's estate, brought suit to recover the proceeds from the cotton
25because Klein received a presidential pardon in 1862.
While Klein was on appeal, the Supreme Court decided United
States v. Padelford.2 6 Padelford contained similar facts as those in Klein.
The Padelford Court affirmed a Court of Claims decision that deter-
mined that the beneficiaries of President Lincoln's pardon were cleansed
of their offense of giving aid and comfort to the enemy.27 Therefore, be-
cause the pardon recipients were legally cleansed of any consequences of
disloyalty, the property owners were entitled to the proceeds under the
1863 Act.28
16. Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421, 429 (1855).
17. Id. (explaining that Congress's newly enacted legislation, which declared that all bridges
across the Ohio River at Wheeling to be lawful structures for the postal service, amended the current
nuisance laws).
18. See id. at 436.
19. See Wasserman, supra note 9, at 66.
20. See United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 146 (1871).
21. Id. at 146-47; see also Martin H. Redish & Christopher R. Pudelski, Legislative Decep-
tion, Separation of Powers, and the Democratic Process: Harnessing the Political Theory of United
States v. Klein, 100 Nw. U. L. REV. 437, 447 (2006); Sager, supra note 15, at 2525-26.
22. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 128-29; Sager, supra note 15, at 2525.
23. Sager, supra note 15, at 2525.
24. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 130-32.
25. See id. at 132.
26. 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 531 (1869), superseded by statute, Act of July 12, 1870, ch. 251, 16
Stat. 235, as recognized in Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310 (2016).
27. Id. at 543.
28. See id.
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In response to the Padelford decision, a disgruntled Congress enact-
29ed the Abandoned and Captured Property Act in 1870 (1870 Act).
Congress passed the 1870 Act specifically to prevent certain individuals,
including Klein, from prevailing in their lawsuit to recovery property.30
The 1870 Act declared that if a person such as Klein accepted a presiden-
tial pardon, courts should consider the pardon as conclusive evidence
that the individual provided aid and comfort to the enemy and was there-
fore not entitled to recovery. 3 The 1870 Act went further and stated that
if a claimant prevailed in the Court of Claims by proving his loyalty
through a presidential pardon, the Supreme Court must remand the case
to the Court of Claims and order dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.32
The Court declared the Act unconstitutional.33 In rejecting the 1870
Act, the Klein Court determined Congress inappropriately meddled with
Supreme Court jurisdiction and stated that Congress was "prescrib[ing] a
rule for the decision of a cause in a particular way." 34 The Court distin-
guished Wheeling Bridge on the ground that the Klein Court believed
Congress prescribed an "arbitrary rule of decision."35 The statute forbade
the Court from giving a presidential pardon the evidentiary effect that the
Court believed it should receive and directed the Court to determine a
pending legal dispute according to Congress's judgment-both unconsti-
tutional acts.36 In contrast, the Court in Wheeling Bridge was "left to
apply its ordinary rules to the new circumstances created by the act."37
There were no major cases analyzing Klein until the Court faced a simi-
lar separation of powers issue in Robertson.38
In 1990, the Ninth Circuit addressed the constitutionality of the
Northwest Timber Compromise (Compromise), which was enacted in
response to ongoing litigation.39 Two parties representing opposite inter-
ests sued over the United States Forest Service's adoption of certain tim-
ber management guidelines.4 The Seattle Audubon Society argued that
the Forest Service's guidelines failed to properly protect northern spotted
owls, while the Washington Loggers Association claimed the guidelines
29. Wasserman, supra note 9, at 61-62.
30. Id.
31. Sager, supra note 15, at 2525.
32. Ronner, supra note 13, at 1044.
33. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 129 (1871); Sager, supra note 15, at 2525-
26.
34. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 146.
35. Id.; see also Wasserman, supra note 9, at 64.
36. Wasserman, supra note 9, at 63-64.
37. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 147; see also Sager, supra note 15, at 2526.
38. See generally Robertson II, 503 U.S. 429 (1992).
39. Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Robertson (Robertson 1), 914 F.2d 1311, 1313 (9th Cir. 1990),
rev'd, 503 U.S. 429 (1992); Araiza, supra note 11, at 1065-66; Ronner, supra note 13, at 1048-49
(explaining that Congress stepped in after the district court granted Seattle Audubon's preliminary
injunction).
40. See Araiza, supra note 11, at 1065; Ronner, supra note 13, at 1048.
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unfairly restricted timber harvesting.41 The litigation involved the classic
"jobs versus the environment" argument, and Congress felt the need to
42intervene. After the district court granted a preliminary injunction in
favor of the Seattle Audubon Society, Congress responded with the
Compromise, which provided some relief for owls and some relief for
loggers.43
The Compromise simultaneously expanded and restricted harvest-
ing in thirteen national forests that contained northern spotted owls.4
Subsection (b)(6)(A) of the Compromise stated that "compliance with
the spotted-owl protective provisions of subsections (b)(3) and (b)(5)
was to be considered 'adequate consideration for the purpose of meeting'
the statutory requirements alleged to have been violated in the pending
Seattle Audubon . . . litigation." 4 5
The Ninth Circuit ruled the Compromise was unconstitutional be-
cause instead of repealing or amending the laws at issue in the lawsuit,
Congress created entirely new obligations through the Compromise.4
Thus, Congress violated the separation of powers doctrine because it
directed courts that if the government satisfied the requirements of sub-
sections (b)(3) and (b)(5) of the Compromise, then the government met
the underlying environmental statutes at issue in the pending litigation.47
The Ninth Circuit determined the statute impermissibly "direct[ed] the
court to reach a specific result and make certain factual findings under
existing law in connection with two cases pending in federal court.""
Additionally, the unanimous three-judge panel found the Compromise's
format troubling because it was drafted with a specific result in mind.49
41. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
42. Araiza, supra note I1, at 1065.
43. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
44. Act of Oct. 23, 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-121, § 318, 103 Stat. 701, 745-50 ("[T]he Congress
hereby determines and directs that management of areas according to subsections (b)(3) and (b)(5) of
this section on the thirteen national forests in Oregon and Washington and Bureau of Land Manage-
ment lands in western Oregon known to contain northern spotted owls is adequate consideration for
the purpose of meeting the statutory requirements that are the basis for the consolidated cases cap-
tioned Seattle Audubon Society et al., v. F. Dale Robertson, Civil No. 89-160 and Washington
Contract Loggers Assoc. et al., v. F. Dale Robertson, Civil No. 89-99 (order granting preliminary
injunction) and the case Portland Audubon Society et al., v. Manuel Lujan, Jr., Civil No. 87-1160-
FR. The guidelines adopted by subsections (b)(3) and (b)(5) of this section shall not be subject to
judicial review by any court of the United States."); see also Ronner, supra note 13, at 1048-49.
45. Araiza, supra note 11, at 1066 (quoting § 318(b)(6)(A), 103 Stat. at 745-50).
46. Robertson I, 914 F.2d 1311, 1317 (9th Cir. 1990) ("Congress did not amend or repeal
laws, as it unquestionably could do, but rather prescribed a rule for the decision of a cause in a
particular way, without changing the underlying laws, as it unquestionably cannot do."), rev'd, 503
U.S. 429 (1992); Araiza, supra note 11, at 1068; Ronner, supra note 13, at 1050.
47. Ronner, supra note 13, at 1050.
48. Robertson I, 914 F.2d at 1316.
49. See Araiza, supra note 11, at 1066. Note that there were no dissenting opinions among the
three-judge panel. See Robertson I, 914 F.2d at 1312, 1317.
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A unanimous Supreme Court reversed.so Justice Thomas authored
the opinion and concluded that the Compromise "replaced the legal
standards underlying the two original challenges . .. without directing
particular applications under either the old or new standards," and, there-
fore, the underlying law was not left intact.51 Further, Justice Thomas
brushed aside the Ninth Circuit's issue with the statute's format, finding
that Congress merely referenced the pending cases as a legislative
52shortcut to identify the five environmental statutes at issue in the case.
Although the Court ultimately determined Congress did amend the
underlying law, Justice Thomas made reference to a less stringent stand-
ard. He stated the following:
Congress might have modified [the Migratory Bird Treaty Act
(MBTA)] directly, for example, in order to impose a new obligation
of complying either with the current § 2 or with subsections (b)(3)
and (b)(5). Instead, Congress enacted an entirely separate statute
deeming compliance with subsections (b)(3) and (b)(5) to constitute
compliance with § 2-a "modification" of the MBTA. .. .
The Court, therefore, focused on the statute Congress could have
written whereas the Ninth Circuit focused on the statute Congress actual-
ly enacted.54
One final important aspect of the Robertson decision occurred in
dicta in the opinion's final paragraph. The Court acknowledged an espe-
cially insightful amicus brief argument that, despite amending a law, a
statute is not automatically constitutional under the Wheeling Bridge
"amend or repeal" rule. According to the brief, "even a change in law,
prospectively applied, would be unconstitutional if the change swept no
more broadly, or little more broadly, than the range of applications at
issue in the pending cases."56 The Court declined to address this argu-
ment because it was "neither raised below nor squarely considered by the
Court of Appeal, nor was it advanced by respondents in this Court."57
Three years later in Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., Justice Breyer,
in his concurring opinion, addressed a similar argument as that of the
Robertson amicus brief.59 In Plaut, the Court deemed a federal statute
50. Robertson 1!, 503 U.S. 429, 437-38 (1992) ("We conclude that subsection (b)(6)(A)
compelled changes in law, not findings or results under old law."); Ronner, supra note 13, at 1052.
51. Robertson II, 503 U.S. at 437; see also Ronner, supra note 13, at 1052.
52. Robertson II, 503 U.S. at 430 ("[T]he subsection's explicit reference to the two pending
cases served only to identify the five statutory requirements that were the basis for those cases.");
see also Ronner, supra note 13, at 1053.
53. Robertson II, 503 U.S. at 439-40.
54. Araiza, supra note 11, at 1070; Ronner, supra note 13, at 1053.
55. Robertson II, 503 U.S. at 441.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. 514 U.S. 211 (1995).
59. Id. at 213.
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unconstitutional that required federal courts to reopen judgments that
were previously final in securities fraud claimsi0 The new law stated that
claims previously dismissed for failing to satisfy the former statute of
limitations should be reopened if the claim meets the timeline under the
new statute.61
The majority focused on the "integrity of final judgments" when
striking down the law.62 However, the Court rejected a Klein challenge
and found that Congress acted permissibly with respect to Klein because
the law did not direct courts to decide a claim in a particular way.63 In-
stead, the new statute only directed courts to apply the new statute of
limitations and explained the legal consequences of meeting the new
time period.64 Unlike the majority, Justice Breyer focused on separation
of powers in his concurrence.65 He was convinced that Congress had
singled out particular parties for unfavorable treatment under the law.66
In Justice Breyer's view, when Congress applies a law to individuals, as
it did in Plaut, Congress impermissibly acts as a court rather than a legis-
lature.
Finally, in National Coalition to Save Our Mall v. Norton, 68 the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit upheld a congres-
sional act that was passed in direct response to a pending lawsuit.69 Plain-
tiffs brought suit to enjoin construction of a memorial, alleging that mul-
tiple federal statutes were violated in approving and constructing the
memorial on the National Mall. 70 The court rejected the idea that specifi-
cally targeting a pending lawsuit rather than an anticipated lawsuit was
fatal, mainly because the statute did amend the underlying law.71 In fact,
the plaintiff conceded that the new statute would have been a valid
amendment to the underlying law had it been enacted before the plain-
tiffs filed the lawsuit.72 The Supreme Court denied certiorari to hear this
case.73
60. Id; see also Araiza, supra note 11, at 1093 (summarizing the facts and holding of Plaut,
514 U.S. at 218-19).
61. Wasserman, supra note 9, at 71.
62. Araiza, supra note 11, at 1093.
63. See Plaut, 514 U.S. at 230 ("We considered and rejected separation-of-powers objections
to the statute based upon ... United States v. Klein."); Wasserman, supra note 9, at 71.
64. Wasserman, supra note 9, at 71.
65. See Plaut, 514 U.S. at 243-44 (Breyer, J., concurring).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 242.
68. 269 F.3d 1092 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
69. Id. at 1097; see also Wasserman, supra note 9, at 68-69.
70. Wasserman, supra note 9, at 68-69.
71. Save Our Mall, 269 F.3d at 1097.
72. Id
73. Id at 1092.
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II. BANK MARKAZI V. PETERSON
A. Facts
The Bank Markazi respondents were victims and family members of
Iran-sponsored terrorism over the past four decades.74 There were over
one thousand respondents separated into sixteen discrete groups, each of
whom obtained judgment against Iran pursuant to the "terrorism excep-
tion"75 of the FSIA in the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia.76 The terrorism exception of the FSIA allows Americans to
sue state sponsors of terrorism in the courts of the United States.77 The
validity of the judgments obtained in district court was not in dispute in
Bank Markazi because Iran's liability to each plaintiff had already been
decided by convincing evidence.78
Despite obtaining judgment against Iran, respondents faced difficul-
ties trying to enforce the terrorism exception.79 The primary reason for
the difficulties was that, despite the terrorism exception, the FSIA shields
from execution the property "of a foreign central bank or monetary au-
thority held for its own account."80 To address these enforcement diffi-
culties, Congress enacted the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002
(TRIA),81 which permits execution of judgments obtained under the ter-
rorism exception against a terrorist party's blocked assets.82 In February
2012, President Obama issued Executive Order No. 13599, which
blocked all "property and interests . . . of any Iranian financial institution,
including the Central Bank of Iran, that are in the United States."83 To
ensure there was no dispute about the availability of the assets called into
question in the Executive Order, Congress passed § 8772 of the Iran
Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012,8 not as an
amendment o the TRIA or the FSIA, but as a freestanding law.85 Section
8772, the relevant provision in Bank Markazi, provided an additional
basis for executing judgments on Iran's bank assets and swept away the
74. Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1319 (2016).
75. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 § 1605, 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(1) (2012).
76. Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1319.
77. 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(1).
78. Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1319-20.
79. Id. at 1317-18.
80. Id. at 1318 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1611(b)(1) (2012), recognized as repealed by implication
in Weininger v. Castro, 462 F. Supp. 2d 457 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)).
81. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of2002, Pub. L. No. 107-297, § 101, 116 Stat. 2322, 2322-
23 (2002).
82. Id. § 201, 116 Stat. at 2337-40; see also Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1318.
83. Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1319 (quoting Exec. Order No. 13,599, Blocking Property of
the Government of Iran and Iranian Financial Institutions, 77 Fed. Reg. 6659 (Feb. 5, 2012)).
84. Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 § 501, 22 U.S.C. § 8772
(2012).
85. Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1318.
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FSIA provision that set forth immunity for Iran's central bank for this
case only.86
B. Procedural History
To seek a court order to enforce their judgments, the sixteen groups
filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York in 2008. The district court reviewed the financial history of
Bank Markazi's (the Bank) assets and determined that the Bank owned
the assets.88 Following the issuance of President Obama's Executive Or-
der and the enactment of § 8772, the judgment holders updated their mo-
tions in 2012.89 All of Bank Markazi's defenses became irrelevant after
§ 8772's enactment, so the Bank changed its defenses.9 It conceded that
Iran held equitable title to the bonds in New York, but argued that § 8772
violated the separation of powers doctrine.91 The district court disagreed
and ordered the requested turnover of nearly two billion dollars in bond
assets held in a New York bank account owned by Bank Markazi.9 The
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit unanimously affirmed the deci-
93sion. The Second Circuit stated that § 8772 did not violate the separa-
tion of powers doctrine because it did not force or compel judicial find-
ings under the old law but simply changed the applicable law relevant to
this case.94 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to con-
sider the separation of powers question.95
C. Opinion of the Court
Justice Ginsburg authored the opinion of the Court.96 Justices Ken-
nedy, Breyer, Alito, and Kagan joined, and Justice Thomas joined in all
but Section II.C. 9 7 The Court affirmed the Second Circuit's ruling, con-
cluding that § 8772 did not violate the separation of powers doctrine.98
86. Id. at 1321 ("Several of [Bank Markazi's] objections to execution became irrelevant
following enactment of § 8772, which, the District Court noted, 'sweeps away ... any ... federal or
state law impediments that might otherwise exist, so long as the appropriate judicial determination is
made."'); id at 1329 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) ("The Bank has vigorously opposed those efforts,
asserting numerous legal defenses. So, in 2012, four years into the litigation, respondents persuaded
Congress to enact a statute, 22 U.S.C. § 8772, that for this case alone eliminates each of the defenses
standing in respondents' way."); see also Peterson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 10 Civ.
4518(KBF), 2013 WL 1155576, at *9-10 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 13, 2013) (discussing 22 U.S.C.
§ 8772(a)(1)).
87. Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1320.
88. Id. at 1321.
89. Id. at 1320.
90. Id. at 1321.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 1322.
94. Id
95. Id.
96. Id. at 1316.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1317.
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Justice Ginsburg began by discussing Klein, Robertson, and Plaut.9
Her review of the relevant cases solidified her belief that "Congress may
indeed direct courts to apply newly enacted, outcome-altering legislation
in pending civil cases."'" With the passage of the new law, Justice Gins-
burg found that "§ 8772 changed the law by establishing new substantive
standards" that the district court could apply to the facts of the case.'ot
Justice Ginsburg then rejected Bank Markazi's two main argu-
ments.102 First, she rejected the claim that § 8772 dictated certain fact-
findings and directed the outcome of the case under the newly enacted
law.1 03 Justice Ginsburg stated that a statute does not invade judicial
power when it requires courts to apply the new legal standard outlined in
the statute to undisputed facts.' She reiterated that Iran's liability in the
case, and its obligation to pay damages, was established four years be-
fore Congress enacted § 8772.105 However, the ownership of the blocked
assets was at issue.' Justice Ginsburg believed that the large volume of
filings suggested that "[t]here [was] . . . plenty . . . to [litigate]."' 07
Next, Justice Ginsburg dismissed Bank Markazi's argument that
§ 8772 was "unprecedented" because it "prescribe[d] a rule for a single
pending case-identified by caption and docket number."08 The Court
explained that he statute in question in Robertson identified two cases
by docket number.'" Additionally, the Court emphasized that § 8772
was not accurately portrayed as a one-case-only statute."10 Instead,
§ 8772 covered a host of post-judgment execution claims filed by several
plaintiffs, all of whom secured evidence-based judgments against Iran in
multiple civil actions."' Justice Ginsburg argued that individual cases do
not lose their identity simply because courts consolidate their claims." 12
To further quash the Bank's second argument, Justice Ginsburg noted the
Supreme Court and lower courts have upheld legislation that "govern[s]
one or a very small number of specific subjects," such as in Wheeling
Bridge and Save Our Mall."13
99. Id. at 1323.
100. Id. at 1325.
101. Id. at 1326.
102. Id. at 1325-26.
103. Id. at 1325.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1322.
106. Id.
107. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Peterson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 10 Civ.
4518(KBF), 2013 WL 1155576, at *31 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 13, 2013)).
108. Id. at 1326-27 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted).
109. Id. at 1326.
110. Id. at 1317.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1327.
113. Id. at 1328.
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Finally, the Court highlighted that § 8772 was an exercise of legis-
lative power regarding foreign affairs.114 Justice Ginsburg said it remains
Congress's prerogative to alter a foreign state's immunity even when it is
the subject of pending litigation.'15 Therefore, the Court ruled that when
Congress "alter[ed] the law governing the attachment of particular prop-
erty belonging to Iran, Congress acted comfortably within its authority
over foreign sovereign immunity and foreign-state assets."ll6
D. Dissenting Opinion
Chief Justice Roberts authored the dissenting opinion and was
joined by an unusual ally, Justice Sotomayor.1 7 The Chief Justice began
by fiercely arguing that the Framers warned that legislative involvement
in judicial matters threatened democracy.118 He then addressed § 8772,
arguing that it was an unconstitutional interference with the Judiciary
because Congress ultimately decided the outcome of this particular
case."9 He declared that by changing the law-for these proceedings
only-simply to guarantee that the respondents win was a violation of
separation of powers.120 The Chief Justice quoted the majority, which
stated that § 8772 "sweeps away . . . any . . . federal or state law impedi-
ments that might otherwise exist" to bar respondents from obtaining
Bank Markazi's assets.121 The dissent had no doubt that "Congress's sole
concern [in passing § 8772] was deciding this particular case, rather than
establishing any generally applicable rules."'2 Indeed, the Chief Justice
noted that § 8772 stated that "nothing in the statute 'shall be con-
strued .. . to satisfy a judgment in any other action against a terrorist
party in any proceedings other than' [this case]."23
Chief Justice Roberts then addressed the majority's position that
§ 8772 left "plenty" of factual determinations for the district court to
adjudicate.124 In actuality, the dissent noted that § 8772 only required two
factual determinations-that Bank Markazi had an equitable interest in
the assets and that no other party did. 12 Both factual determinations were
simply legislative deception. President Obama already decided the assets
were the "property of the Government of Iran" when he froze the money
as part of his Executive Order.126 Next, on numerous occasions the Bank
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1329.
116. Id.
117. Id. (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
118. Id. at 1331-32.
119. Id. at 1332.
120. Id.
121. Id. (quoting Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1317 (majority opinion)).
122. Id. at 1333.
123. Id. (footnote omitted) (quoting 22 U.S.C. § 8772(c)(1) (2012)).
124. Id. at 1335.
125. Id.
126. Id. (quoting Exec. Order No. 13,599, Blocking Property of the Government of Iran and
Iranian Financial Institutions, 77 Fed. Reg. 6659 (Feb. 5, 2012)).
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insisted it was the sole owner of the blocked assets.12 7 Since both of these
determinations were undisputed and well established by the time Con-
gress enacted § 8772, Congress simply picked the winner.128
The dissent also challenged the majority's position that the Court
has previously allowed Congress to pass legislation that targeted specific
cases by docket number.129 Chief Justice Roberts noted that in Robertson,
the relevant statute merely referenced particular cases as a shortcut for
describing the environmental statutes at issue, not to limit the law's ef-
fect to those cases alone.130 Referring to statutes through case names is
permissible as long as the statute does not single out the defendant for
adverse treatment, and the statute amends the underlying law.'31
Finally, Chief Justice Roberts argued that the majority mischaracter-
ized the Executive's and Legislature's historical authority to recognize a
foreign state's sovereign immunity.132 He did not dispute that Congress,
with the approval of the President, may withdraw Iran's foreign sover-
eign immunity.'3 3 However, Chief Justice Roberts noted that by eliminat-
ing any protections that New York State law or international law might
have offered Bank Markazi, § 8772 did "considerably more than with-
draw sovereign immunity." 34
The Chief Justice ended his argument by returning to his original
point, discussing the long-term policy effects of the Legislature's intru-
sion into the Judiciary's arena.'3 1 Chief Justice Roberts stressed that
Congress can now "unabashedly pick the winners and losers in particular
pending cases" and professed that the Court laid the groundwork for ex-
tensive expansion of legislative authority at the Judiciary's expense.136
III. ANALYSIS
The Bank Markazi decision greatly expanded the powers of Con-
gress in such a way that Congress can now draft legislation that invades
the Judiciary's authority.'37 In actuality, the Court veered off-course in
Robertson, and both Robertson and Bank Markazi were wrongly decided
because neither relevant statute amended or repealed the underlying laws
in their respective cases. The following analysis proceeds in three main
sections. Section A will first argue that it is inherently within the Legisla-
ture's authority to prescribe rules to a court that alters the outcome of a
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 1336.
130. Id.




135. Id. at 1337-38.
136. Id. at 1338.
137. See supra Section II.C.
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pending case so long as Congress amends or repeals the underlying
law-with limited exceptions. Section B will address the major limita-
tion, namely, that even if the legislation does amend or repeal the statute
in question, it must not target a specific party. Finally, Section C propos-
es a three-factor test that courts should apply each time Congress passes
a law specifically aimed at pending litigation.
A. Congress Has the Authority to Prescribe Rules That Alter the Out-
come of Specific Litigation Subject to Limited Exceptions
In the opinion for the Court, Justice Ginsburg makes clear in her in-
troduction that under Supreme Court precedent, "Congress . .. may
amend the law and make changes applicable to pending cases, even when
the amendment is outcome determinative."1 38 More often than not, the
amendment is constitutional and results in positive change. Consider, for
example, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which superseded any law that
allowed employers to discriminate against an employee on the basis of
membership in a protected class.139 Congress prescribed rules of decision
that required courts to find in favor of plaintiffs if they could establish
evidence that they were fired because of their "race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin." 1a This new statute applied to prospective and pend-
ing cases and is an example of Congress permissibly affecting pending
litigation by altering the preexisting general substantive law.
However, the first limit 4 1 to Congress's power to prescribe rules
that alter the outcome of specific litigation is that Congress must actually
amend the underlying law. When Congress truly amends the underlying
substantive law, it can normally do so without referencing specific pend-
142ing cases.
Congress cannot deceive the electorate by passing a law that com-
mandeers the Judiciary in an attempt to achieve its political goals without
the responsibility of passing legislation.14 3 If Congress attempts to elimi-
nate an applicable defense, such as central bank immunity, it must "elim-
inate[] [the] applicable defense in all cases."l44 Congress would deceive
the public if it left the defense in place in the underlying statute but com-
pelled a court to reject the defense in other cases. 145
138. Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1317 (majority opinion).
139. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (2012).
140. Id.
141. The second limitation is outlined below in Section II.B. As a preview, the second limita-
tion is that Congress cannot single out a specific party for adverse treatment even if it amends the
underlying law.
142. Redish & Pudelski, supra note 21, at 457.
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Legislative deception may occur "through either 'micro' or 'macro'
deception."'k Micro deception occurs when the Legislature "leaves the
generalized substantive law intact, but legislatively directs that a particu-
lar litigation (or group of litigations) arising under that law be resolved in
a manner inconsistent with the dictates of that pre-existing generalized
law."1 47 Congress employed this exact tactic in passing § 8772, and the
Supreme Court mistakenly approved it.
The similarities are striking between § 8772 and the Abandoned and
Captured Property Act of 1870, the statute at issue in Klein. The 1870
Act attempted to accomplish three feats, all of which threatened the sepa-
ration of powers. First, the 1870 Act did not amend the 1863 Act, which
was the underlying statute in question in Klein and Padelford.148 Rather,
the 1870 Act simply barred claimants who received a presidential pardon
from recovering monetary proceeds under the 1863 Act.1 49 The 1870 Act
manipulated the 1863 Act "without actually amending it." 5 o Second,
Congress enacted the 1870 Act immediately following Padelford in an
attempt to prevent Klein and similar claimants from prevailing on their
claims.151 It was precisely tailored to Klein's pending litigation. Con-
gress's goal in passing the 1870 Act was to circumvent the Padelford
rule so lawsuits such as Klein's would not succeed.152 Finally, the 1870
Act clearly favored the government. The Court of Claims awarded Klein
$125,300 for compensation.53 Thus, Congress would clearly have bene-
fited from withholding Klein's payment.
The first similarity between the 1870 Act and § 8772 is that neither
law amended the underlying statute at issue in the case. The majority
acknowledged that Congress "[e]nacted [§ 8772] as a freestanding meas-
ure, not as an amendment to the FSIA or the TRIA."'iM Yet later in her
opinion, Justice Ginsburg stated: "By altering the law governing the at-
tachment of particular property belonging to Iran, Congress acted com-
fortably within the political branches' authority over foreign sovereign
immunity and foreign-state assets."ss These two assertions are irrecon-
cilable. Subsection 8772(c) makes clear that the FSIA or the TRIA re-
main intact.156 In order to satisfy the Wheeling Bridge "amend or repeal"
146. Vladeck, supra note 9, at 253 (summarizing Martin H. Redish and Christopher R. Pu-
delski's article, Legislative Deception, Separation of Powers, and the Democratic Process: Harness-
ing the Political Theory of United States v. Klein, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 437, 439 (2006)).
147. Redish & Pudelski, supra note 21, at 439.
148. Ronner, supra note 13, at 1044.
149. Id.
150. Vladeck, supra note 9, at 254.
151. Ronner, supra note 13, at 1044.
152. Id. at 1044, 1069.
153. Id. at 1043.
154. Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1318 (2016).
155. Id. at 1329.
156. See 22 U.S.C. § 8772(c)(1) (2012) ("Nothing in this section shall be construed-(1) to
affect the availability, or lack thereof, of a right to satisfy a judgment in any other action against a
terrorist party in any proceedings other than proceedings referred to in subsection (b) .... ).
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standard, Congress needed to either amend the FSIA or the TRIA, or
remove the expiration date of § 8772. But Congress failed to do so and
tried to do exactly what it attempted to do in Klein-manipulate the un-
derlying law, namely the FSIA, without actually amending it.
Next, Congress passed § 8772, like the 1870 Act, in direct response
to pending litigation. Congress had a noble goal-assist the victims in
enforcing the judgment against Iran.m Therefore, Congress simply cir-
cumvented its own statute, the FSIA, which shields from execution the
prQperty of a foreign central bank, and drafted legislation precisely tai-
lored to Bank Markazi's case.158 Finally, Congress controls the purse of
the United States government. With America's growing debt, using
Iran's two billion dollars instead of taxpayer dollars to compensate ter-
rorist victims favors the government.
Despite Justice Ginsburg's claim that Klein "has been called 'a
deeply puzzling decision,"' Klein continues to stand as the standard for
maintaining separation of powers.159 Klein provided a separation of pow-
ers framework that ensures the unelected Judiciary polices the legislative
process to eliminate legislative deception.160
Scholars have argued that there is no plausible situation in which
Congress could permissibly alter the result in a pending lawsuit without
simultaneously amending the existing law at issue in the litigation.161 Yet
that is exactly what Congress did in passing § 8772. There are two key
differences between the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and § 8772. First, the
anti-discrimination law applied to pending litigation and future instances
of discrimination. Here, Congress made clear that § 8772 has no effect
on future litigation.1 62 Second, despite amending the Civil Rights Act
during presumably multiple pending court cases, courts were required to
apply new outcome-determinative law to the facts of each individual
case. In Bank Markazi, there was no fact-finding required. The two fac-
157. See id. §8772(a)(1)(C).
158. 28 U.S.C. § 1611(b)(1) (2012) ("Notwithstanding the provisions of section 1610 of this
chapter, the property of a foreign state shall be immune from attachment and from execution, if-(1)
the property is that of a foreign central bank or monetary authority held for its own account, unless
such bank or authority, or its parent foreign government, has explicitly waived its immunity from
attachment in aid of execution, or from execution, notwithstanding any withdrawal of the waiver
which the bank, authority or government may purport to effect except in accordance with the terms
of the waiver. . . ."), recognized as repealed by implication in Weininger v. Castro, 462 F. Supp. 2d
457 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
159. Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1323 (quoting Daniel J. Meltzer, Congress, Courts, and
Constitutional Remedies, 86 GEO. L.J. 2537, 2538 (1998)); see id at 1334 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)
("The majority characterizes Klein as a delphic, puzzling decision whose central holding-that
Congress may not prescribe the result in pending cases-cannot be taken at face value.").
160. Redish & Pudelski, supra note 21, at 440; Vladeck, supra note 9, at 262.
161. See Redish & Pudelski, supra note 21, at 457.
162. See 22 U.S.C. § 8772(c)(1).
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tual determinations were established prior to the enactment of § 8772,
leaving "nothing" for the district court to decide.1 63
B. Congress Cannot Single Out Specific Parties
The second major limitation to the rule discussed in the preceding
section is the prohibition on singling out specific parties. The Court men-
tioned the "targeting one party" question in Robertson but did not resolve
the issue.M The amicus brief referenced in the final paragraph of the
Robertson opinion challenged the long-standing position that a newly
enacted law is always valid under Wheeling Bridge as long as it amends
or repeals the law.165 Justice Thomas went out of his way to mention the
argument, but declined to answer the question it posed since neither party
raised the issue in their briefs or in the lower courts.'66
Three years after the Robertson decision, in Plaut, Justice Breyer
expressed concern that Congress applied the statute only to a discrete,
closed class of cases.167 He believed Congress had singled out specific
individuals for unfavorable legal treatment.168 When Congress targeted
specific parties, Justice Breyer believed Congress was applying the law
(as opposed to making law), which is the job of the Judiciary.16 9 This is
the primary reason that courts should be extremely critical of statutes that
are not of general applicability.
Laws that lack general character should always be suspect and pre-
sumed unconstitutional.170 Non-general laws are typically "odd-looking,
163. Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1335 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
164. Robertson 1!, 503 U.S. 429, 441 (1992) ("We have no occasion to address any broad
question of Article III jurisprudence. The Court of Appeals held that subsection (b)(6)(A) was un-
constitutional under Klein because it directed decisions in pending cases without amending any law.
Because we conclude that subsection (b)(6)(A) did amend applicable law, we need not consider
whether this reading of Klein is correct. The Court of Appeals stated additionally that a statute would
be constitutional under Wheeling Bridge if it did amend law. Respondents' amicus Public Citizen
challenges this proposition. It contends that even a change in law, prospectively applied, would be
unconstitutional if the change swept no more broadly, or little more broadly, than the range of appli-
cations at issue in the pending cases. This alternative theory was neither raised below nor squarely
considered by the Court of Appeals, nor was it advanced by respondents in this Court. Accordingly,
we decline to address it here.").
165. Id (summarizing an amicus brief position); Ronner, supra note 13, at 1047 ("Congress
can prescribe rules of decision in pending cases as long as it does so by amending or changing the
law."); id. at 1055 ("The amicus had challenged the proposition that a statute is constitutional under
Wheeling Bridge if it amends the law.").
166. Robertson II, 503 U.S. at 441.
167. See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 243 (1995) (Breyer, J., concurring) ("It
lacks generality, for it applies only to a few individual instances.").
168. Id. at 243-44; see also Araiza, supra note 11, at 1094.
169. Plaut, 514 U.S. at 243-44; see also Araiza, supra note 11, at 1093-94 ("For Justice Brey-
er, the problem with section 27A was that it applied to a discrete, closed class of cases, indeed, a
class of cases, the particulars of which Congress seemed to be familiar. These characteristics con-
vinced him that there was simply too great a danger that Congress had singled out particular individ-
uals for unfavorable treatment-the resurrection of lawsuits against them. In other words, by legis-
lating so as to affect only a closed, limited, and apparently identified class of individuals, Congress
applied law to individuals, thereby acting like a court rather than making law.").
170. See Araiza, supra note 11, at 1090; Redish & Pudelski, supra note 21, at 445.
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[J]udiciary-intruding"171 laws and should only satisfy the separation of
powers doctrine when they concern truly unique subjects. For example,
the cases cited by Justice Ginsburg in the majority opinion primarily deal
with unique subjects. She argued that the Supreme Court and lower
courts have upheld statutes that "governed one or a very small number of
specific subjects."1 72 One such case was Save Our Mall.173 That case
concerned a single memorial that was "legitimately confined to 'a unique
public amenity."'1 74 Additionally, she cited Wheeling Bridge, which also
dealt with unique government property-a postal road.175 Both of these
cases, like the majority of her other cited cases, concerned federal prop-
erty.
Beyond federal property, Congress should not enact legislation di-
rected at a single class of cases. Essentially, Congress conducted its own
hearing and held a "trial by [L]egislature" in enacting § 8772.17' The
Framers specifically protected against legislative trials when they created
the tripartite government, and for good reason. Justice Powell correctly
noted in Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Chadha that "trial by a
[L]egislature lacks the safeguards necessary to prevent the abuse of pow-
er." 1 77 He elaborated on his thesis and stated:
Unlike the [J]udiciary or an administrative agency, Congress is not
bound by established substantive rules. Nor is it subject to the proce-
dural safeguards, such as the right to counsel and a hearing before an
impartial tribunal, that are present when a court or an agency adjudi-
cates individual rights. The only effective constraint on Congress'
power is political, but Congress is most accountable politically when
it prescribes rules of general applicability. When it decides rights of
specific persons, those rights are subject to "the tyranny of a shifting
majority."1 7 8
As Chief Justice Roberts stated in his dissent, Congress's sole aim
in passing § 8772 was "deciding this particular case, rather than estab-
lishing any generally applicable rules."1 7 9
171. Wasserman, supra note 9, at 90.
172. Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1328 (2016) (citations omitted).
173. Id. (referring to Nat'l Coalition to Save Our Mall v. Norton, 269 F.3d 1092 (D.C. Cir.
2001), along with a number of other cases).
174. Brief of Federal Courts Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 23-24, Bank
Markazi, 136 S. Ct. 1310 (No. 14-770), 2015 WL 7450417, at *23-24 [hereinafter Brief of Federal
Courts Scholars] (quoting Save Our Mall, 259 F.3d at 1097).
175. Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1328 (citing Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge
Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421, 430 (1855)).
176. Brief of Federal Courts Scholars, supra note 174, at 20 (quoting United States v. Brown,
381 U.S. 437, 442 (1965)).
177. Id. at 21 (quoting Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 962
(1983) (Powell, J., concurring)).
178. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 966 (Powell, J., concurring).
179. Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1333 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (referring to 22 U.S.C.
§ 8772(c)(1) (2012)); see also Brief of Federal Courts Scholars, supra note 174, at 23 ("No law is
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In the present case, Justice Ginsburg dismissed the singling out ar-
gument by claiming this statute is "not fairly portrayed as a one-case-
only regime." 80 Instead, she argued that § 8772 "covers a category of
postjudgment execution claims filed by numerous plaintiffs who, in mul-
tiple civil actions, obtained evidence-based judgments against Iran to-
gether amounting to billions of dollars."181 She quoted language from
§ 8772 that subjects the Bank's assets to execution "to satisfy any judg-
ment" against Iran for acts of terrorism.182 Despite the language quoted
by Justice Ginsburg, the statute makes clear in the following section that
it only applies to this specific case, identified by docket number, declar-
ing that "[n]othing in this section shall be construed . .. to affect the
availability, or lack thereof, of a right to satisfy a judgment in any other
action against a terrorist party."l83
It is possible that Justice Ginsburg misinterpreted the Robertson de-
cision when she used it to argue that the Court has upheld statutes that
identify cases by docket number.1m In Robertson, the Court dismissed
the singling out argument because it determined that Congress used the
two pending cases as a shortcut to identify the five statutory require-
ments at issue.' 85 The Robertson Court stated that the statute named "two
pending cases in order to identify five statutory provisions."'86 Chief
Justice Roberts highlighted this discrepancy in his dissent. He said the
two cases mentioned by name in Robertson were only used as a reference
to describe the five underlying environmental statutes at issue; Congress
did not intend to "limit the statute's effect to only those cases alone.",8 7
Bank Markazi was wrongly decided because Congress explicitly
targeted the Bank when it enacted § 8772, violating the separation of
powers doctrine. The sequence of events in the case highlights the consti-
tutional violation. First, Bank Markazi invoked its sovereign immunity
under the FSIA in the district court, but § 8772 eliminated the Bank's
sovereign immunity. Next, the Bank raised the defense that its status
as a distinct juridical entity under international law and federal common
general if Congress may pick and choose when litigation under it will succeed and when it will
fail.").
180. Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1317 (internal quotation marks omitted).
181. Id.
182. Id (quoting 22 U.S.C. § 8772(a)(1) (emphasis added)).
183. 22 U.S.C. § 8772(c)(1) (emphasis added).
184. Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1326-27 ("The amended law in Robertson, however, also
applied to cases identified by caption and docket number, and was nonetheless upheld. Moreover,
§ 8772 . . . facilitates execution of judgments in 16 suits, together encompassing more than 1,000
victims of Iran-sponsored terrorist attacks. Although consolidated for administrative purposes at the
execution stage, the judgment-execution claims . .. were not independent of the original actions for
damages and each retained its separate character.").
185. Robertson II, 503 U.S. 429, 440 (1992).
186. Id.
187. Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1336 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
188. Id. at 1332.
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law released it from liability for Iran's debt.189 Section 8772 then re-
moved that defense to ensure the Bank was liable.)90 Finally, the Bank
raised a defense under New York law, claiming that the state law did not
allow plaintiffs to execute their judgments against the Bank's assets.'91
Again, § 8772 made the Bank's assets subject to execution.'9 The sole
purpose of § 8772 was to remove all legal defenses against the Bank so
that the plaintiffs would prevail. It is in this country's best interest to
maintain three separate branches of government. The Bank Markazi deci-
sion threatens this separation and the American governmental framework
the Framers carefully crafted.
C. Proposed Three-Factor Test for Separation ofPowers Issues
The Court should adopt a three-factor test for evaluating whether
Congress violates the separation of powers doctrine when it passes a
statute in response to pending litigation.1 9 3 The first factor would require
a court to closely examine the congressional legislation and consider
whether the statute actually amends or repeals the underlying law.194 The
second factor would require a court to decide if the statute is so closely
tailored to the pending litigation that it can be "said to fit glove-like
around the live case or controversy."19 5 The third factor would ask
whether the statute favors the government, especially if the government
is a party to the litigation.196 A court should weigh these three factors
each time Congress enacts legislation aimed at impacting pending litiga-
tion.
The first factor is the most important factor. Each time a court rules
on the constitutionality of a statute, it must closely examine the law at
issue. A court should ask the following question: Does the law actually
amend or repeal the underlying law at issue in the pending litigation
without telling a court how to decide a particular case? Supreme Court
precedent is clear that Congress may amend or repeal a law with the in-
tent of producing certain outcomes for certain facts.'97 However, Klein
established the principle that Congress cannot direct a court how to de-
cide a particular claim.'98
189. Id. at 1332-33.
190. Id. at 1333.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. See Ronner, supra note 13, at 1047-48.
194. See id.
195. Id. at 1048.
196. Id
197. See Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1317 ("Congress, our decisions make clear, may amend
the law and make the change applicable to pending cases, even when the amendment is outcome
determinative."); Robertson II, 503 U.S. 429, 440-41 (1992); see also Wasserman, supra note 9, at
71-72.
198. See United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 148 (1871).
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The second factor would require a court to decide if the statute is
too closely tied to a live case or controversy. Statutes aimed at one spe-
cific case should always be considered suspect, especially if the law ben-
efits one party. A court should ask the following question: Does the stat-
ute single out one party to the benefit of the other party? However, as
stated above in Section III.B, there are situations where Congress must
address a "unique public amenity," such as a national memorial or
bridge.199 In these rare situations, it is permissible for Congress to enact
laws that are precisely tied to pending litigation. But barring litigation
concerning unique public structures or amenities, any closely tailored
statute should be presumed unconstitutional.
Finally, a court should strictly scrutinize the statute when it favors
the government in pending litigation.200 As a matter of fairness, Congress
should not be its own judge in a case ruling on the constitutionality of
congressional action.20 1 The Klein Court rationalized its holding by stat-
ing the following:
In the case before us, the Court of Claims has rendered judgment for
the claimant and an appeal has been taken to this court. We are di-
rected to dismiss the appeal, if we find that the judgment must be af-
firmed, because of a pardon granted to the intestate of the claimants.
Can we do so without allowing one party to the controversy to decide
it in its own favor? Can we do so without allowing that the
[L]egislature may prescribe rules of decision to the Judicial Depart-
ment of the government in cases pending before it? We think
not .... 202
Klein is the quintessential case in which Congress tried to resolve
pending litigation through legislative trial. If Congress can control either
the method or conclusion of the judicial decision making process, the
formal protections of independent branches of government would prove
to be of little value.203
This Comment will now apply the proposed test to the facts of Bank
Markazi. When the factors are applied to the Bank Markazi facts, all
three factors weigh against the constitutionality of § 8772.
199. Brief of Federal Courts Scholars, supra note 174, at 23; see Pennsylvania v. Wheeling &
Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421, 429-30 (1855); Nat'l Coal. to Save Our Mall v. Nor-
ton, 269 F.3d 1092, 1094, 1097 (D.C. Cir. 2001) ("This seems particularly sound where Congress is
addressing a unique public amenity (or disamenity, depending on one's viewpoint), such as the
Memorial or the bridge at issue in Wheeling Bridge.").
200. See Ronner, supra note 13, at 1048 (explaining that the Klein Court struck down the 1870
Act in part because it favored the government); see also Redish & Pudelski, supra note 21, at 444-
45 (explaining that Congress lacks constitutional authority to decide the outcome of lawsuits in its
favor).
201. Ronner, supra note 13, at 1071.
202. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 146.
203. Redish & Pudelski, supra note 21, at 450.
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1. Factor One-Examining the Statute to Determine If It Amends
or Repeals the Underlying Law
Close examination of § 8772 reveals that the statute does not actual-
ly amend or repeal the underlying law-namely the FSIA. Justice Gins-
burg performs a precise analysis of § 8772(a) and § 8772(b) but fails to
mention § 8772(c) in her opinion.204 She dedicates all of Section L.A as a
review of the "statutory provisions relevant to this case," but through
omission, the majority opinion did not consider § 8772(c) relevant in this
case.205 Section 8772(c) states that "[n]othing in this statute shall be con-
strued-(l) to affect the availability, or lack thereof, of a right to satisfy
a judgment in any other action against a terrorist party in any proceed-
ings other than proceedings referred to in subsection (b). ...
Congress carefully drafted § 8772 to achieve its desired outcome in
"Peterson et al. v. Islamic Republic of Iran et al., Case No. 10 Civ. 4518
(BSJ) (GWG),"207 while not amending the FSIA. Congress convinced the
Bank Markazi majority because a reading of only § 8772(a) would make
208a judge believe the statute amended the underlying law. Section
8772(a) states generally that a blocked asset held in the United States,
including an asset of the central bank of Iran, shall be subject to execu-
tion or attachment in order to satisfy any judgment for compensatory
damages.209 But as noted in the preceding paragraph, a closer reading of
the entire statute reveals Congress's true intention in passing § 8772-to
pick the winner of this case.210 For unbeknownst reasons, Congress did
not want to amend or repeal the section of the "FSIA [that] shields from
execution property 'of a foreign central bank or monetary authority held
for its own account."'
211
The Court's misguided precedent concerning factor one originated
in Robertson. The Robertson Court significantly lowered the bar for the
"amend or repeal" standard established by the Wheeling Bridge Court in
1855.212 The Robertson Court concluded "subsection (b)(6)(A) com-
pelled changes in law, not findings or results under old law." 213 However,
careful analysis of the statute suggests otherwise.2 14
Subsection (b)(6)(A) states the following:
204. See Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1318-19 (2016).
205. Id. at 1317.
206. 22 U.S.C. § 8772(c)(1) (2012).
207. Id. § 8772(b).
208. Id. § 8772(a)(1) (explaining that the statute subjects the designated financial assets to
execution "to satisfy any judgment" against the Government of Iran).
209. Id.
210. Id. § 8772(c)(1).
211. Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1318 (2016) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1611(b)(1)
(2012)).
212. See Ronner, supra note 13, at 1047, 1055.
213. Robertson II, 503 U.S. 429, 438 (1992).
214. See Act of Oct. 23, 1989 Pub. L. No. 101-121, § 318, 103 Stat. 701, 745.
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Congress hereby determines and directs that management of areas
according to subsections (b)(3) and (b)(5) of this section on the thir-
teen national forests . .. known to contain northern spotted owls is
adequate consideration for the purpose of meeting the statutory re-
quirements that are the basis for the consolidated cases captioned Se-
attle Audubon Society et al., v. F. Dale Robertson, Civil No. 89-160
and Washington Contract Loggers Assoc. et al., v. F. Dale Robertson,
Civil No. 89-99 (order granting preliminary injunction) and the case
Portland Audubon Society et al., v. Manuel Lujan, Jr., Civil No. 87-
1160-FR. The guidelines adopted by subsections (b)(3) and (b)(5) of
this section shall not be subject to judicial review by any court of the
United States.215
Congress essentially declared that if § (b)(3) and § (b)(5) are satis-
fied, a court is directed to find that the five statutes216 at issue in the two
pending cases are necessarily satisfied as well.2 17 Congress's directive
told the courts how to interpret the underlying statutes without actually
amending the statutes.218 Instead of applying the facts of the case to the
five valid environmental statutes at issue and allowing a court to interpret
the statute, a typical Judiciary function, Congress directed the courts to
interpret the statutes according to Congress's interpretation.219
For the Ninth Circuit, the "critical distinction" was between amend-
ing the law underlying the pending case, which is constitutional, and the
actual prescription of a rule of decision, which violates the constitutional
doctrine of separation of powers.220 This is why the circuit panel unani-
mously ruled that "§ 318(b)(6)(A) 'does not, by its plain language, repeal
or amend the environmental laws underlying this litigation,' but rather
'directs the court to reach a specific result and make certain factual find-
ings under existing law in connection with two [pending] cases."'
221
222
In passing § 8772, Congress did not repeal the FSIA or the TRIA.
It simply created a new statute that applied to this case and this case on-
215. Id.
216. Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MBTA) § 143(b), 16 U.S.C. § 703 (2012); National Forest
Management Act of 1976 (NFMA), 16 U.S.C. § 1600 (2012); National Environmental Policy Act of
1969 (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2012); Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 § 102,
43 U.S.C. § 1701; (2012); Oregon and California Railroad and Coos Bay Wagon Road Grant, 43
U.S.C. § 1181 (2012).
217. § 318(b)(6)(A), 103 Stat. at 745.
218. Id.
219. See id; Araiza, supra note 11, at 1066-68.
220. See Robertson 1, 914 F.2d 1311, 1315 (9th Cir. 1990) ("More recent Supreme Court
authority also strongly suggests that the critical distinction, for purposes of deciding the limits to
Congress' authority to affect pending litigation through statute, is between the actual repeal or
amendment of the law underlying the litigation, which is permissible, and the actual direction of a
particular decision in a case, without repealing or amending the law underlying the litigation, which
is not permissible."), rev'd, 503 U.S. 429 (1992); Araiza, supra note 11, at 1066-68.
221. Robertson II, 503 U.S. 429, 436 (1992) (quoting Robertson I, 914 F.2d at 1316).
222. Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1318-19 (2016) ("Enacted as a freestanding
measure, not as an amendment to the FSIA or the TRIA, § 8772 provides that, if a court makes
specified findings, 'a financial asset . . . shall be subject to execution . . . in order to satisfy any
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ly.223 Admittedly, Justice Ginsburg stated that § 8772 was not enacted as
an "amendment to the FSIA or the TRIA."224 The statute did not repeal
either of the laws because the statute made clear it only applies to the
"proceedings in the United States District Court for the Southern District
of New York in Peterson et al. v. Islamic Republic of Iran et al., Case
No. 10 Civ. 4518 (BSJ) (GWG)."225 However, Congress could have
simply amended the FSIA to remove the central bank immunity, and the
victims could likely recover through that method.
The first factor weighs against the constitutionality of § 8772. The
Court strayed from its long-standing precedent in requiring actual
amendment of the underlying statute. Section 8772 decided this case
only, and it does not affect any other case dealing with Iran-sponsored
terrorism. Future terrorist victims may be left without legislative cover-
age because a central bank's assets, even if frozen by the President, will
be protected.
2. Factor Two-The Prohibition on Singling Out One Party
For Chief Justice Roberts, passing a statute that is expressly intend-
ed to affect only one case and then expire after the litigation is complete
is a major constitutional issue. The Chief Justice argued that § 8772 tar-
geted the Bank.226 He asserted that because the statute was so closely
tailored to this case, Congress might as well have said, "respondents
win." 22 7 This aspect of the statute is distinguishable from the Northwest
Timber Compromise. The dissent had less issue with the Compromise
because, as the name suggests, Congress drafted the legislation as a mid-
dle ground between both parties.228 1The Compromise did not favor one
party at the benefit of the other.229 This distinction is significant because
the majority heavily relied on Robertson in upholding § 8772.
When a court considers factor two, it ensures the statute can outlive
the pending litigation, and it prevents Congress from picking winners
and losers in pending litigation. When a law is tailored to one specific
party or case, except in situations as detailed in Section III.B such as
unique public amenities, Congress typically intends for the legislation to
judgment to the extent of any compensatory damages awarded against Iran for damages for personal
injury or death caused by' the acts of terrorism enumerated in the FSIA's terrorism exception. Sec-
tion 8772(b) defines as available for execution by holders of terrorism judgments against Iran 'the
financial assets that are identified in and the subject of proceedings in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York in Peterson et al. v. Islamic Republic of Iran et al., Case
No. 10 Civ. 4518(BSJ)(GWG), that were restrained by restraining notices and levies secured by the
plaintiffs in those proceedings."' (footnote omitted) (citations omitted)).
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. 22 U.S.C. § 8772(b)-(c) (2012).
226. Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1332-33 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
227. Id. at 1330.
228. Robertson II, 503 U.S. 429, 433 (1992).
229. Id.
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expire after the pending case is resolved. This type of legislation, which
picks the winner in a pending lawsuit, invades the judicial power of the
United States government.
Here, the statute states that it does not apply beyond the life of case
number 45 18.230 Section 8772 lacks any evidence of general application,
and removes all legal defenses for Bank Markazi in this one particular
case only. Section 8772 would not even apply to the respondents if the
district court were to dismiss the case without prejudice due to some evi-
dentiary technicality (this is further proof § 8772 did not amend the un-
231derlying law, thus, violating factor one)2. Section 8772 is so specific
that if the respondents were to re-file their case and receive a new case
number, § 8772 would no longer apply.232
By brushing aside the singling out argument in Bank Markazi, the
Court set the standard that "Congress can unabashedly pick the winners
,233and losers in particular pending cases." Contrary to the Court's deci-
sion, legislating against one specific party violates the separation of
powers doctrine. The second factor weighs heavily in favor of the Bank
in this case.
3. Factor Three-Government-Favoring Legislation
Congress passed § 8772 to favor itself. Congress enacted § 8772 in
2012 at the height of Iran's nuclear expansion.234 Potentially to maintain
diplomatic relations, Congress made the Court execute the assets against
Iran. Chief Justice Roberts alluded to this when he stated that Congress
"commandeer[ed] the courts to make a political judgment look like a
judicial one."235 He further stated that Congress has sufficient authority
to give relief to the plaintiffs through confiscating and disposing of Iran's
property without needing to "seize" the Judiciary's authority.236
230. See 22 U.S.C. § 8772(c).
231. Brief of Federal Courts Scholars, supra note 174, at 17.
232. See 22 U.S.C. § 8772(b)(1) ("The financial assets described in this section are the finan-
cial assets that are identified in and the subject of proceedings in the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York in Peterson et al. v. Islamic Republic of Iran et al., Case No. 10
Civ. 4518 (BSJ) (GWG), that were restrained by restraining notices and levies secured by the plain-
tiffs in those proceedings, as modified by court order dated June 27, 2008, and extended by court
orders dated June 23, 2009, May 10, 2010, and June 11, 2010, so long as such assets remain re-
strained by court order.").
233. Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1338 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
234. Shreeya Sinha & Susan Campbell Beachy, Timeline on Iran's Nuclear Program, N.Y.
TIMES, http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/11/20/world/middleeast/Iran-nuclear-timeline.html
(last updated Apr. 2, 2015) (explaining Tran's pursuit of nuclear weapons and the state of relations
between the United States and Iran in 2012).
235. Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1337 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) ("[N]o comparable history
sustains Congress's action here, which seeks to provide relief to respondents not by transferring their
claims in a manner only the political branches could o, but by commandeering the courts to make a
political judgment look like a judicial one.").
236. Id.
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Congress was not a party in this case, but the federal government
certainly had an interest in the outcome. Many of the plaintiffs were fam-
ily members of terrorism victims. For example, the lead plaintiff, Debo-
rah Peterson, lost her brother in the 1983 Marine Corps Barracks truck
bombing in Beirut, Lebanon.237 Through § 8772, Congress legislatively
supported their cause-compensating the victims of those killed on offi-
cial duty-by using seized money from the Government of Iran instead
of taxpayer dollars. 238When Congress compensated the victims from the
9/11 terrorist attacks, it paid out $15.8 billion from government programs
to support the victims.239 In Bank Markazi, Congress attained its desired
outcome by usurping the Judiciary's authority and deciding the case in
favor of the government.
Congress and the President should have simply confiscated the two
billion dollars in Iranian assets and "used, administered, liquidated, sold,
240
or otherwise dealt with" the money to benefit the victims and families.
The political branches have plenty of authority to confiscate and dispose
of Iran's sovereign property without seizing the Judiciary's jurisdic-
*241tion.
The third factor, much like the first two factors, weighs against the
constitutionality of § 8772. Congress passed this statute with one clear
winner in mind, which strongly favored the plaintiffs and Congress.
Congress compensated the terrorist victims by using seized funds from
the Government of Iran. The only cost is the threat to democracy, as the
Court allowed Congress to further invade the realm of judicial authority.
4. Weight of the Factors
When evaluating a newly enacted statute passed in response to
pending litigation, courts should ask three questions to determine wheth-
237. See Matt Ford, What the Supreme Court's Ruling on Iranian Assets Means, ATLANTIC
(Apr. 20, 2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/04/bank-markazi/479190/; Greg
Stohr, Iran Terror Victims Win at U.S. Supreme Court, Can Collect $2 Billion, BLOOMBERG POL.
(Apr. 20, 2016, 8:08 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/politics/artices/2016-04-20/iran-terror-
victims-win-at-u-s-high-court-can-collect-2-bln.
238. Ford, supra note 237; Stohr, supra note 237.
239. LLOYD DIXON & RACHAEL K. STERN, COMPENSATING THE VICTIMS OF 9/11, RAND CORP.
(2004), http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/researchbriefs/2005/RAND_RB9087.pdf;
Aaron Smith, The 9/11 Fund: Putting a Price on Life, CNN MONEY (Sept. 7, 2011, 9:38 AM),
http://money.cnn.com/2011/09/06/news/economy/911 compensationfund/.
240. See Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1337 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); see also 50 U.S.C.
§ 1702(a)(1)(C) (2012) ("The President may ... confiscate any property, subject o the jurisdiction
of the United States, of any foreign person, foreign organization, or foreign country that he deter-
mines has planned, authorized, aided, or engaged in such hostilities or attacks against he United
States; and all right, title, and interest in any property so confiscated shall vest, when, as, and upon
the terms directed by the President, in such agency or person as the President may designate from
time to time, and upon such terms and conditions as the President may prescribe, such interest or
property shall be held, used, administered, liquidated, sold, or otherwise dealt with in the interest of
and for the benefit of the United States, and such designated agency or person may perform any and
all acts incident o the accomplishment or furtherance of these purposes.").
241. Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1337 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
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er Congress violated the separation of powers doctrine: (1) Does the law
actually amend or repeal the underlying law at issue in the pending litiga-
tion without directing the courts to decide the case a particular way?; (2)
Does the statute single out one party to the benefit of the other party?;
and (3) Does that law favor the government? When applying these fac-
tors to Bank Markazi, all three factors weigh in favor of the Bank.
If courts fail to adopt and apply this test or a similar test, the impli-
cations of the Court's decision in Bank Markazi is the advent of a newly
empowered and unchecked Legislature. Both the Robertson statute and
§ 8772 threaten the separation of powers doctrine because they imper-
missibly invade the Judiciary's arena.242 The Court gave Congress a
blank check to "alter[] the legal and political impact of the controlling
generalized substantive law in specific contexts without also altering that
substantive law itself." 243 It can now undermine the separation of powers
by passing laws that enlist the Judiciary in an elaborate attempt to de-
ceive the public.24 Indeed, the dissent finds it troubling that the majority
opinion recognized no limit to its holding beyond the prohibition against
statutes that say "Smith wins."245 Because the Court failed to draw a firm
line, Congress will use the Court's decision as "a 'blueprint for extensive
expansion of the legislative power' at the Judiciary's expense,246 feeding
Congress's tendency to 'extend[] the sphere of its activity and draw[] all
power into its impetuous vortex."'
247
CONCLUSION
The separation of powers doctrine is the bedrock of the American
government. The Framers were paranoid of concentrating too much
248
power in one branch of government. When Congress attempts to ex-
pand its power and usurp the Judiciary's authority, it is the Judiciary's
249
job to police the action. If the Court continues to allow Congress to
whittle down the Judiciary's authority, like it did in Robertson and Bank
Markazi, it may be too late to avoid the danger of tyranny. Many legal
scholars have warned against congressional expansion, arguing that the
usurpation typically takes form when Congress attempts to achieve poli-
242. Araiza, supra note 11, at 1136 (arguing that "statutes such as section 318 threaten the
fundamental constitutional balance and, ultimately, the individual rights that that balance seeks to
protect").
243. Redish & Pudelski, supra note 21, at 450.
244. Id. at 451.
245. Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1335 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Bank Markazi, 136
S. Ct. at 1326 (majority opinion)).
246. Id. at 1338 (quoting Metro. Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for Abatement of Aircraft
Noise, Inc., 501 U.S. 252, 277 (1991)).
247. Id. (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 309 (James Madison)).
248. Martin H. Redish & Elizabeth J. Cisar, "IfAngels Were to Govern ": The Need for Prag-
matic Formalism in Separation of Powers Theory, 41 DUKE L.J. 449, 451 (1991).
249. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 177 (1803); THE FEDERALIST NO.
78 (Alexander Hamilton).
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cy results not through direct enactments but through manipulation of the
courts.250 This is exactly what Congress accomplished with § 8772.
The Bank Markazi decision sends a message to Congress that the
Legislature can usurp the Judiciary's power with only the slightest re-
striction-it cannot say "Party A wins." Besides declaring a winner out-
right, Congress can now pass legislation so closely tailored to a pending
lawsuit that it might as well say "Party A wins." The Court erred in Rob-
ertson, where it reversed a unanimous Ninth Circuit decision, because
Congress exceeded its authority and decided the outcome of pending
litigation. That same Court acknowledged but failed to answer the harder
question of whether legislation violates separation of powers when it is
tailored to one specific case only. The Court concluded that the statute at
issue created "no occasion to address any broad question of Article III
jurisprudence."2 51
Using the dangerous precedent set in Robertson,252 the majority in
Bank Markazi further expanded Congressional power by upholding
§ 8772 without any restrictions other than the prohibition against explic-
itly telling a court who wins. But the underlying constitutional principle
of separation of powers is too important to avoid in cases such as Bank
Markazi or Robertson. It is the Supreme Court's duty to take "all possi-
ble care . . . to defend itself against [the] attacks" of the other govern-
mental branches.253 While it may be difficult to draw the line between
judicial and legislative authority, "the entire constitutional enterprise
depends on there being such a line."25
Cory J. Wroblewski-
250. See Redish & Pudelski, supra note 21, at 438-39; Vladeck, supra note 9, at 255.
251. Robertson II, 503 U.S. 429, 441 (1992).
252. See id. at 440-41; see also Redish & Pudelski, supra note 21, at 440-41 ("On occasion,
the Court has described the Klein holding in what are largely obscure and misleading terms. On
other occasions, it may have disingenuously ignored blatant violations by Congress of the democrat-
ically imposed limits on its authority to manipulate the judicial process, without either acknowledg-
ing or seemingly comprehending the serious stakes involved for purposes of the success of American
democracy.").
253. Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1335 (2016) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (quot-
ing THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton)).
254. Id. at 1336 (emphasis added).
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